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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 17-1635 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
      
v. 
 
ISAN CONTANT, 
                          Appellant 
 __________________________________  
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Crim. No. 1-10-cr-00355-001) 
District Judge: Yvette Kane 
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 8, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: August 8, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Isan Contant appeals from an order of the District Court denying as moot his 
motion to alter or amend the judgment and motion for recusal.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will summarily affirm. 
 Contant, a native and citizen of Trinidad and Tobago, was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania of hindering his removal in 
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(C).1  After a bench trial, the District Court found him 
guilty and sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 14 months.  Judgment was entered 
on June 23, 2011.  While Contant’s direct appeal was pending, the Government 
successfully removed him from the United States.  In April, 2012, we affirmed the 
criminal judgment, see United States v. Contant, 467 F. App’x 141, 143 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(“Contant I”). 
 In April, 2014, Contant, who had since completed his sentence for the hindering 
removal conviction, filed a pro se petition for writ of error coram nobis in the District 
Court, collaterally attacking his conviction.  In an order entered on September 12, 2014, 
the District Court denied the coram nobis petition, and Contant appealed.  In January 
2016, we affirmed, see United States v. Contant, 638 F. App’x 146, 148 (3d Cir. 2016) 
(“Contant II”). 
 On April 11, 2016, Contant filed another pro se petition for writ of error coram 
nobis in the District Court.  Citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), Contant claimed that the 
District Court lacked jurisdiction to convict him of hindering his removal because, at the 
                                              
1 An Immigration Judge ordered Contant’s removal and his appeal of that order to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals was unsuccessful. 
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time of his indictment and conviction, his petitions for review of the final order of 
removal were pending in this Court.  He also argued that his counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to dismiss the criminal indictment for lack of jurisdiction or a 
motion challenging the validity of the order of removal.  Citing United States v. 
Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), Contant further contended that the hindering 
removal statute, 8 U.S.C § 1253(a)(1)(C), is unconstitutional as applied to him.  Contant 
then filed a motion to supplement the coram nobis petition.   
 In an order entered on August 29, 2016, the District Court denied the coram nobis 
petition, and denied as moot Contant’s motion to supplement it.  The Court noted that it 
had previously rejected jurisdictional and ineffective assistance of counsel arguments, 
and that we had affirmed those determinations on appeal in Contant II.  The Court thus 
declined to revisit any issues relating to jurisdiction or counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness 
in the second coram nobis petition. The Court rejected Contant’s due process argument 
because § 1252(b)(7)(A) provides that if “the validity of an order of removal has not been 
judicially decided, a defendant in a criminal proceeding charged with violating section 
1253(a) of this title may challenge the validity of the order in the criminal proceeding 
[but] only by filing a separate motion before trial.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(7)(A) (brackets 
and emphasis added).  Although Contant’s consolidated petitions for review were indeed 
pending at the time, he had failed to file a motion before trial challenging the removal 
order.  Thus, his argument that he had been denied due process of law was not 
persuasive.  The District Court also held that Mendoza-Lopez was inapposite. 
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 Contant timely appealed on September 19, 2016.  While that appeal was pending, 
Contant, on September 30, 2016, filed in the District Court an untimely motion to alter or 
amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) (“A motion to 
alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after the entry of the 
judgment.”).2  Less than a week later he also filed a motion for recusal.  The Government 
answered the Rule 59(e) motion and motion for recusal, arguing that the motions should 
be dismissed.   
 On February 9, 2017, we summarily affirmed the District Court’s order denying 
Contant’s second coram nobis petition, see United States v. Contant, --- F. App’x ---, 
2017 WL 527897 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Contant III”).  We held that the District Court properly 
declined to revisit Contant’s claim that jurisdiction to convict him of hindering his 
removal was lacking; that the Court did not err in denying his second coram nobis 
petition without first requiring the Government to respond; and that the Court did not err 
in denying as moot his motion to supplement his petition.  We agreed with the District 
Court that coram nobis relief was not warranted because Contant failed to take advantage 
of the opportunity provided by § 1252(b)(7)(A), and that Mendoza-Lopez could be 
distinguished.  In summarily affirming the District Court’s order denying Contant’s 
motion to supplement, we noted our prior holding in Contant II that coram nobis relief 
would not lie based on developments that took place well after Contant hindered his 
                                              
2 An untimely Rule 59(e) motion does not toll the time for taking an appeal, Fed. R. App. 
Pro. 4(a)(4)(A). 
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removal, see Contant III, --- F. App’x ---, 2017 WL 527897 at *3 (citing Contant II, 638 
F. App’x. at 148-49). 
In an order entered on February 24, 2017, the District Court denied Contant’s Rule 
59(e) motion and motion for recusal on the basis of mootness.  Contant now appeals that 
order.3  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4  Our Clerk advised Contant that 
his appeal was subject to summary action under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6..   
We will summarily affirm the order of the District Court because no substantial 
question is presented by this appeal, Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  The 
purpose of a motion for reconsideration is “‘to correct manifest errors of law or fact or to 
present newly discovered evidence.’”  Max’s Seafood Café v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 
677 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Harsco Corp. v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3d Cir. 1985)). 
The District Court may grant a motion for reconsideration if the moving party shows: (1) 
an intervening change in the controlling law; (2) the availability of new evidence which 
was not available when the court issued its order; or (3) the need to correct a clear error 
of law or fact or to prevent a manifest injustice.  See North River Ins. Co. v. Cigna 
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).   
The District Court denied Contant’s Rule 59(e) motion for reconsideration as moot 
because the arguments he raised in it were the same as those we considered on appeal in 
                                              
3 The Court also denied Contant’s motion for leave to file documents electronically.  
Contant’s notice of appeal does not reference this part of the District Court’s order and 
thus we will not review it, see Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). 
 
4 Contant does not need a certificate of appealability to proceed with this appeal.  See 
United States v. Baptiste, 223 F.3d 188, 189 n.1 (3d Cir. 2000) (per curiam). 
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Contant III and ultimately decided adversely to him.  This was proper.  Contant’s Rule 
59(e) motion made the same jurisdictional argument, the same argument relating to the 
constitutionality of the hindering removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)(C), the same 
argument concerning the propriety of a supplement to the coram nobis petition, and the 
same argument concerning the lack of an answer from the Government.  We agree with 
the District Court that when a litigant uses Rule 59(e) merely to relitigate the issues 
already decided, and, in the meantime, the appeals court has summarily affirmed the 
District Court, the Rule 59(e) motion is properly dismissed as moot.  In any event, 
Contant plainly did not meet the standard for reconsideration in that his Rule 59(e) 
motion was not based on an intervening change in the law, was not based on new 
evidence, and was not, given our affirmance, based on any alleged error by the District 
Court or manifest injustice.  Contant’s post-judgment motion for recusal is meritless and 
we will summarily affirm on that basis.  Contant’s assertion of bias is unsupported by 
anything in the record, and the District Court’s general familiarity with his cases does not 
warrant recusal.  Cf. Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 
(3d Cir. 2000) (party’s displeasure with legal rulings does not provide adequate basis for 
recusal).   
 For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District Court 
denying Contant’s Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment and motion to 
recuse. 
